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2OPTIMAL SEASONAL ALLOCATION OF GENERIC DAIRY ADVERTISING
EXPENDITURES
Escalating media advertising costs have prompted shifts away from advertising to 
non-advertising promotion activities in the dairy industry’s generic commodity 
promotion program. As advertising budgets become tighter, determining the optimal 
allocation o f these funds becomes particularly important. Optimal seasonal generic 
advertising expenditure shares for the national fluid milk and cheese generic advertising 
programs were estimated, with shares higher in the first and fourth quarters for fluid  
milk and relatively even across quarters for cheese. Estimates ofproducer welfare gains 
from re-allocation were substantial, with average welfare gains o f 12 to 24percent o f 
annual advertising investments.
I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. milk producers contribute 15 cents for every hundredweight (100 pounds) of milk 
sold to support generic advertising, promotion, and product research, designed with the ultimate 
goal of enhancing producer returns. Fluid milk processors contribute an additional 20 cents per 
hundredweight of fluid milk sales for fluid milk advertising through the Milk Processor 
Education Program. Combined, these programs have historically raised more than $300 million 
annually. Generic advertising efforts have received more attention and the largest share of 
checkoff budgets, but escalating advertising costs and the investigation of alternative forms of 
product promotion costs have prompted a shift away from generic advertising in recent years, 
particularly for the farmer-funded programs. As advertising budgets become tighter, 
determining the optimal allocation of those funds becomes particularly important. In order to
3maximize producer returns from a given annual budget, optimal temporal policies should be 
investigated. Do existing allocation decisions follow a seasonal pattern and, if  so, why? Can 
producer returns be improved by altering the allocation investment rule? These are the types of 
issues explored here.
While an abundance of research in generic commodity promotion has focused on 
estimating producer returns on investment (or benefit-cost ratios), much less attention has 
focused on strategic issues, such as identifying preferred target markets and consumer groups, or 
determining optimal temporal advertising spending strategies. The objective of this paper is to 
estimate optimal seasonal generic advertising expenditure shares for the national fluid milk and 
cheese programs using empirical results from a time-varying parameter demand model. While 
optimal temporal strategies have been developed for fluid milk programs in New York State and 
New York City markets (e.g., Kinnucan and Forker, 1986; Liu and Forker, 1990; Van de Kamp 
and Kaiser, 2000), they have not been applied to the national generic advertising programs; nor 
have they been applied to other dairy products such as cheese. The demand model applied here 
is unique in that generic advertising response is allowed to vary over time as a function of 
various market and demographic characteristics. In addition, estimated generic advertising and 
price elasticities vary over time, leading to the logical application of estimating optimal temporal 
advertising spending patterns.
It is certainly the case that both the level and the allocation of advertising can be derived 
under optimal investment rules. However, we focus solely on the allocation of a fixed annual 
advertising budget, taking historical annual expenditures as given. While this ignores whether 
overall advertising is at the optimal level (in fact, most empirical studies indicate that generic 
advertising expenditures are substantially below optimal levels), it simplifies the analysis to
4something more logistically manageable (reallocation of a given budget), and avoids the 
burdensome structural and political pressures that often determine annual budgets.
II. BACKGROUND
Dorfman and Steiner (1954) evaluated the issue of optimal advertising allocations and 
concluded that profits from advertising are inversely related to the level of price sensitivity. For 
example, if  price elasticities are lower in certain seasons, advertising intensity should be 
increased in those seasons to increase industry profits. Nerlove and Arrow (1962) developed a 
dynamic counterpart to the Dorfman and Steiner model, whereby optimal advertising levels are 
determined based on maximizing the present value of net industry revenues by appropriate price 
and advertising policies over time. They concluded that firms should keep a constant advertising 
to sales ratio, based on elasticities of demand with respect to price and advertising goodwill 
(Nerlove and Arrow, 1962). While they set the stage for much of the optimal temporal 
advertising work in generic advertising, both models assume that firms can control both price 
and output, which is not the case with promotion of agricultural commodities.
Determining optimal temporal advertising strategies in generic dairy promotion has, 
however, received more recent attention. Kinnucan and Forker (1986) allowed for seasonal 
variation in the response to generic advertising by incorporating monthly dummy variables 
interacted with the level of advertising goodwill in an econometric demand model for the New 
York City market. They found significant variation in the goodwill elasticities that followed a 
smooth seasonal pattern, peaking in the spring and reaching a low during the summer months. 
This pattern largely mimicked sales patterns; i.e. the cumulative effect of milk advertising on 
sales was greatest in months when consumer demand was strongest. Simulation results
5concluded, consistent with Nerlove and Arrow (1962), that producer returns from advertising 
would be maximized when expenditures followed a regular seasonal pattern.
Liu and Forker (1990) used a deterministic optimal control framework to identify optimal 
advertising expenditure patterns for the New York State fluid milk promotion program. Their 
results, like Kinnucan and Forker’s (1986), indicate advertising more during the winter and less 
during the late spring and early summer -- a seasonal spending distribution largely the result of 
seasonal variation in the Class I fluid milk price differential.
Vande Kamp and Kaiser (2000) developed a dynamic optimization model to determine 
optimal temporal advertising strategies when consumers’ response to advertising is asymmetric. 
The model was applied to the New York City fluid milk market. The asymmetric nature of 
demand response to generic advertising produced a pulsing advertising strategy, where periods 
of heavy advertising are followed by low or no advertising. This result was driven by the 
advertising asymmetry characteristic, as all other exogenous demand shifters outside of generic 
advertising (including farm milk price) were assumed constant at sample means.
Kinnucan and Myrland (2002) derived static decision rules to determine optimal seasonal 
allocations of fixed advertising budgets when substitution effects are important and prices are 
determined competitively. They applied their allocation rule to generic advertising of salmon in 
France. In contrast to optimal control models, the static framework permits a wider array of 
economic forces to be accounted for than is often feasible with dynamic models (Kinnucan and 
Myrland, 2002). Optimal allocation decisions are determined by seasonal price elasticities of 
supply and demand, advertising elasticities, and product expenditure shares. In addition, 
Kinnucan and Myrland identified economic conditions under their framework in which pulsing 
strategies could occur.
6Schmit and Kaiser (2004) developed a time-varying demand model for fluid milk and 
cheese, incorporating generic advertising activity, that produces demand elasticities that vary 
over time. The main objective of this work was to empirically estimate market and demographic 
effects on changes in the level of advertising response over time. However, given the time- 
varying nature of the model, estimated seasonal price and advertising elasticities can be 
computed and applied directly to the static allocation rules developed by Kinnucan and Myrland 
(2002).
We proceed now with a brief description of the Kinnucan and Myrland (K-M) allocation 
rule. Next we highlight the empirical specification of the Schmit and Kaiser (2004) time-varying 
parameter demand model. Then we describe our data and empirical results. We close with some 
summary conclusions and suggestions for future research.
A. K-M Optimal Seasonal Allocation
The K-M seasonal allocation rule originates from the traditional equi-marginal rule in 
economic theory. Specifically, producer profits are maximized when the last dollar spent on 
advertising in each season provides exactly the same increment to total revenue. Following 
Kinnucan and Myrland (2002), this can be expressed as:
(1) dp1 
% d a 1 "
=  %2
dp2 
% d a 2 "
= ■■■ = q
&dP s ^
%das "
where qk, p k , ak are quantity, price, and advertising expenditures in the kth season (k=1, ..., s).
It is clear from (1) that price enhancement by the advertising expenditure governs the allocation 
decision. Applying the allocation rule to quarterly demand and price estimates, we assume s=4. 
Converting (1) into elasticity form, Kinnucan and Myrland (2002) show:
(2) 0 " E pU1 = 0 2-1 IE = 0 -1 E = 0 -1 Ep 2 ,a2 u 3 ^ p 3 ,a 3  u  4 ^ p 4 ,a4 ’
7where 9 k  = a k / p k qk  represents the intensity of advertising relative to the value of production
dp a
and E pk ak = — k— — is the reduced-form price elasticity with respect to generic advertising that
dak  P -
defines advertising’s seasonal influence on price. Seasonal spending cannot exceed the fixed
_ 4 _ 4
annual budget ( A ); i.e., £ ak  = A . Dividing this by £ p k qk  = PQ results in the budget
k =1 k =1
constraint
(3) £ r , 9 =9  ,
k =1
where rk  = p kqk/PQ  is the kth season’s revenue share and 9 = A/PQ  is the annual advertising 
expenditure intensity. Solving (2) and (3) simultaneously for the optimal seasonal advertising 
shares, k  k  = ak/A  , Kinnucan and Myrland (2002) show that
(4) K k  = rk E pk ,ak  £  rk E pk,ak  .
k=1
The result is intuitively appealing in that it clearly distinguishes the two key components 
driving allocation decisions -  season-specific revenue shares and the ability of generic 
advertising activity to influence price (Kinnucan and Myrland, 2002). Revenue shares are easy 
enough to compute; the reduced-form price elasticities, however, are not readily available, but 
can be derived from an economic structural model. Kinnucan and Myrland (2002) developed 
these elasticities based on a two-good system of demand and supply equations where product 
substitution is important and only one of the goods is advertised. In such a system, own- and 
cross-price elasticities are required, as well as own- and cross-advertising effects.1 If substitution 
effects are unimportant -- a hypothesis from the Schmit and Kaiser (2004) model that we also
8posit here -- the reduced-form price elasticity with respect to generic advertising simplifies to a 
function of the single good parameters, or:
(5) E pk,ak = a  k l  (e k + n  k) ,
where a k , e k , and n k are season-specific advertising, supply, and demand (absolute value) 
elasticities. As a reduced-form elasticity, E pk ak represents the net effect of an increase in
generic advertising on price after taking supply response into account (Kinnucan and Myrland, 
2002).
As Kinnucan and Myrland (2002) state, the simplification of ignoring product 
substitution does imply that the advertising price effect is unambiguously positive (as in Nerlove 
and Waugh, 1961), which may overstate producer welfare gains from advertising. However, 
given that the existence of clear (or at least strong) substitutes to fluid milk or cheese is 
debatable, with mixed results in the literature, and the time-varying parameter model does not 
explicitly account for substitution effects, we proceed with the simpler allocation decision. The 
time-varying parameter model is particularly well suited for an optimal temporal allocation 
evaluation; however, future research should examine more rigorously the importance of 
substitution effects for these products. Substituting (5) into (4) yields the optimal seasonal 
allocation rule:
r k a  k l (e k +n  k )
( 6 )  K  k = 4
Z  r k a  k / ( e  k  + n k )
k=1
B. Time-Varying Demand Model
The time-varying parameter model estimated in Schmit and Kaiser (2004) is useful to the 
study of optimal temporal allocation decisions as estimated generic advertising and price
9elasticities vary over time. For brevity, we briefly highlight the model formulation here. The 
time-varying parameter specification can be expressed as:
(7) Yt = a  0 + a 'X t +§BGWt + y  tGGWt + et ,
where Yt is product disappearance at time period t ( t= l,.. ,,T), X t is a ^-dimensional vector of 
explanatory variables other than advertising, BGWt and GGWt are the goodwill stocks of brand 
and generic advertising expenditures, respectively, a 0, a , ^ , and y  t are parameters to be
estimated, and et is a random disturbance term with mean zero and variance a  2 .
The time-specific parameter specification immediately creates a degrees of freedom 
problem, which requires that some structure be placed on the time-varying response. Therefore, 
the goodwill generic advertising parameter is defined as:
(8) y t = exp(  o + 5 Z t ) + vt ,
where exp() represents the exponential function, 5 0 is the intercept parameter to estimate, Z t is 
a vector of explanatory variables assumed to affect consumer response to generic advertising, 5 
is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and vt is a random disturbance term with mean zero,
variance a v E (et ,vt) = 0 V t , and E (vt , vT) = 0 V t ^  t .
To allow for carryover effects of advertising, the lag-weights were approximated using a 
quadratic exponential distributed lag structure (EDL). Following Cox (1992, p. 149), the EDL 
structure for generic advertising can be described as:
(9) GGWt = ^  w j ,g GADVt- j  and w j ,g  = exp( o,g + hg J + Kg J 2),
j =0
where the subscript g  identifies the generic advertising parameter, w j  represents the Jg+1 lag 
weights, GADVt-j  is the t-jth generic advertising expenditure, and (i=0,1,2) are generic
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advertising EDL parameters to be estimated.2 A lag length of six quarters is modeled for all 
advertising variables: generic and branded, and fluid milk and cheese.3 
Substituting (8) and (9) into (7) yields:
(10) Yt = a  0 + « 'X t + ^ Z  Wj,bBADVt-j + exp(  0 + S'Zt ) 2  Wj,gGADVt-j + s
j=0
Jg
j=0
where s t = et + vt V  w. GADV, ..t t t J,g t-j' t ^ t  j
j =0
An advantage of this formulation is that the combined demand equation in (10) reduces to a
nonlinear least-squares estimation problem with generic advertising goodwill stocks interacting
with the variables contained in Z. As a result, the demand response to generic advertising is
allowed to vary over not only time, but also over those variables contained in Z.
In Schmit and Kaiser (2004), the fluid milk model was specified as:
(11) ln RFDt = a 0m + a m ln RFPt + a 2m ln INCt + a 3m ln Tt + a 4m ln AGE5t + a !"BSTt
+ a 6" QTR1t + a 7mQTR21 + a m QTR3t +^  m ln BMGWt + y  ^  ln GMGWt + e"
and
V m = exp(§ 0m + 5 mRFPt +5 mINCt +5 mAGE5t + 5 4mBLACK) + v )  , 
where the m  superscript refers to fluid milk demand parameters, RFD is per capita retail fluid 
milk demand (milkfat equivalent basis), RFP is the consumer retail price index (CPI) for fresh 
milk and cream deflated by the CPI for nonalcoholic beverages, INC is per capita disposable 
personal income deflated by the CPI for all items, T is a time trend (Tt = 1, ..., 108), AGE5 is the 
percentage of the U.S. population under six years of age, BST  is an intercept dummy variable for 
availability of bovine somatotropin (bST) (1994-current equals 1, 0 otherwise), QTR1, QTR2, 
and QTR3 are quarterly seasonal dummy variables, BMGW  and GMGW are the national brand 
and generic advertising goodwill variables as defined above, and BLACK is the percent of the 
population identified as African American.
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Similarly, the retail cheese demand model was specified as:
(12) ln RCDt = a 0 + <  ln RCPt + a 2c ln INCt + a 3c ln FAFHt + a 4c ln OTHER + a c5QTR1t 
+a IQTR21 +a 0QTR3t + ^ c ln BCGWt + y  0 ln GCGWt + e0
and
V 0 = exp(§ ( +5 0RCPt + 8 0INCt +8 0FAFHt +8 0AGE20441 +5 00OTHER) + v) , 
where the c superscript refers to cheese demand parameters, RCD is per capita retail cheese 
demand (milkfat equivalent basis), RCP is the CPI for cheese deflated by the CPI for meats, 
OTHER is the proportion of the population identified as Asian/Hispanic (specifically, non-White 
and non-African American), FAFH is the real per capita expenditure on food eaten away from 
home, and BCGW  and GCGW are the brand and generic cheese advertising goodwill variables, 
respectively.
C. Elasticities
For brevity, the estimated coefficients in (11) and (12) from Schmit and Kaiser (2004) are 
included in the appendix.4 Given the estimated parameters, quarterly price and generic 
advertising elasticities were computed for 1997-2001. The own-price elasticity of demand for 
fluid milk model can be expressed as:
(13)
d ln RFDt =a  m 
d ln RFPt 1
+ 8 m exp(5 0 + 5 'Z t )ln GMGWt • RFPt .
The parameters in (13) were replaced with their estimated values and elasticities computed using 
actual historical data values for price, advertising, and other variables in Zt. Cheese price 
elasticities of demand were similarly computed. Computed quarterly price elasticities from 1997 
through 2001 are shown in Figure 1. Average quarterly price elasticities for fluid milk and 
cheese for 1997-2001 were approximately -0.051 and -0.303, respectively (Table 1).
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As is apparent, seasonal variation in fluid milk price elasticities exists, with estimates 
generally lower in the first and fourth quarters. Using this information alone, the Dorfman and 
Steiner model would support advertising more intensely in these two quarters, a seasonal pattern 
recommended in the fluid milk applications of Kinnucan and Forker (1986) and Liu and Forker 
(1990). Somewhat less seasonal variation was exhibited in the cheese price elasticities; however, 
average cheese price elasticities were slightly lower in the first two quarters of the year.5
In order to account for carry-over effects of advertising, long-run advertising elasticities 
were used. These elasticities can be computed from the associated goodwill stock variables and 
were explicitly modeled in Schmit and Kaiser (2004). The long-run generic advertising elasticity 
for the fluid milk model can be expressed as:
(14) e “  - exp(8" + 8 'Z - ^ ■.
The long-run advertising elasticity for cheese follows analogously. The parameters in (14) were 
replaced with their estimated values and elasticities computed using actual historical data values 
for variables in Zt.
It should be noted that the goodwill advertising elasticities are based on the historic lag 
structures, and this implies that the pattern of the lag structure does not differ by season. If these 
patterns differ by season -- for example, the peak advertising effect may occur immediately for 
advertisements placed in the first quarter, but be delayed a quarter for advertisements placed in 
the third quarter -- the goodwill elasticities would need to be decomposed to take this dynamic 
effect into account. As in Schmit and Kaiser (2004), we assume that lag structure does not vary 
with the season, and leave this for future research with an alternative model formulation that
could take this into account.
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Computed quarterly long-run generic advertising elasticities are illustrated in Figure 2. 
Generic advertising elasticities were similar in magnitude over this time period, with average 
estimates of 0.029 and 0.030 for fluid milk and cheese, respectively (Table 1). In addition, while 
the absolute levels of changes are not large, clearer seasonal patterns exist, particularly for 
cheese. Cheese advertising elasticities were higher in the first two quarters of the year than in 
the last two. Schmit and Kaiser (2004) showed this variation to be largely the result of seasonal 
differences in per capita spending on food eaten away from home and an increasing proportion 
of Asians and Hispanics throughout the sample period.
Fluid milk generally exhibited higher advertising elasticities in the first and fourth 
quarters, but the differences were relatively smaller than those seen with cheese.6 Changes in the 
level of response were largely the result of declines in the proportion of young children in the 
population, and changes in income levels and African American population proportions (Schmit 
and Kaiser, 2004). Both elasticity patterns would, however, support advertising more intensely 
in the same periods favored by the price elasticity levels above.
III. INPUT DATA
The time-varying parameters from Schmit and Kaiser (2004) were estimated using national 
quarterly data from the time period 1975 through 2001. Advertising expenditure data came from 
Dairy Management, Inc. (DMI, 2002) and were deflated by a media cost index constructed from 
information provided by DMI. Fluid milk and cheese quantities (on milk-fat equivalent basis) 
represent aggregate market disappearance and were matched with milk class prices (USDA, 
2002a). Demographic and income data came from Economagic, LLC. (2002), while food 
expenditure data came from USDA (2002b). Average quarterly values of model elasticities, data 
variables, and computed parameters needed for the K-M allocation rule are included in Table 1.
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Farmer checkoff dollars go to fund both fluid milk and cheese advertising programs. 
However, milk processor advertising is also directed to the fluid milk market, and the 
econometric model from Schmit and Kaiser (2004) sums both farmer and processor sources of 
fluid milk advertising expenditures together. Therefore, optimal allocation estimates for fluid 
milk are made with respect to total generic advertising efforts for fluid milk, including both 
farmer and processor contributions. Ultimately then, any revisions in allocation of promotion 
funds would require a cooperative effort of both parties. Average quarterly advertising spending 
(Table 1) indicates higher spending in the first two quarters for fluid milk, but no consistent 
seasonal trend was exhibited when looking at each year. This is due, in part, to the fact that the 
historic seasonal spending patterns for farmer and processor advertising were different. Cheese 
advertising does seem to indicate some drop in activity in the third quarter, but patterns over the 
last two years show reasonably equal quarterly levels of advertising activity.
Prices received by milk producers are based on the distribution of product to alternative 
uses. Fluid milk processors pay a higher Class I price (P1), while cheese processors pay the 
Class III price (P 3)7 To determine individual optimal allocations for fluid milk and cheese 
advertising, class prices (i.e., P1 for fluid milk and P3 for cheese) and product disappearance 
levels were used to estimate seasonal farm-level revenue shares. While no strong seasonal trends 
were exhibited, Class I prices were higher on average in the first and fourth quarters, while the 
third (primarily) and fourth quarters were highest for cheese (Table 1). Stronger seasonal trends 
were exhibited on the consumption side, with fluid milk disappearance higher in the first and 
fourth quarters and cheese disappearance higher in the final two quarters.
IV. APPLICATION AND RESULTS
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Class prices and product disappearance levels were used to compute seasonal industry 
revenue shares for fluid milk and cheese (Figure 3). The price and disappearance patterns are 
reinforced here, with first and fourth quarter average revenue shares highest for fluid milk, and 
third and fourth quarter average revenue shares highest for cheese (Table 1). Changes in 
seasonal variation across years were also apparent; most notably for fluid milk in 2000 and 2001.
From (5), reduced-form price elasticities with respect to generic advertising were 
computed. Seasonal supply elasticities were not available, so a seasonal invariant long-run 
supply elasticity (s ) estimate of 0.313 was used (Schmit and Kaiser (2002)). Reduced-form 
price elasticities for cheese demonstrated a clear seasonal pattern, with higher elasticities in the 
first half of the year. A seasonal pattern was less apparent for the reduced-form price elasticities 
for fluid milk; however, on average, reduced-form generic advertising elasticities were higher in 
the first and fourth quarters (Table 1).
Finally, applying the empirical estimates from Figures 3 and 4 to (6) results in the 
optimal seasonal allocation results in the first section of Table 2. For each year, 1997 through 
2001, the K-M allocation rule was applied, taking annual expenditure budgets as given and using 
the time-specific computed parameter values. Seasonal allocation decisions varied by year. 
Specifically, from 1997 to 1999, allocations for fluid milk were w-shaped, reflecting higher 
allocations in the 1st and 4th quarter; but in 2000 and 2001 the allocation patterns were nearly 
reversed. This was due to the seasonal flattening of the reduced-form price elasticities in 2000 
and 2001 and revenue shares that increased throughout both years.
Even larger differences across years were apparent in the optimal seasonal allocation 
decisions for cheese. Specifically, seasonal allocations were w-shaped in the first two years, 
mixed in 1999, and hump-shaped in 2000 and 2001 (Table 2). Given that seasonal revenue
16
shares and advertising price elasticities demonstrated largely offsetting effects (i.e., revenue 
shares were generally higher in the final two quarters of the year, while advertising’s impact on 
price was larger in the first two quarters), a higher level of sensitivity to the final allocation 
decisions resulted. With no consistent seasonal spending pattern in actual expenditure levels, 
relative changes from actual to optimal levels varied widely for both products.
It is clear from these results that forecasting appropriate seasonal allocations would be 
difficult, ex ante. That is, given differences in the magnitude of seasonal trends in prices, 
elasticities, and product demand, the ability to forecast what to do in future years seems elusive 
at best. Therefore, rather than simply using actual historical levels and seeing what “should have 
been done,” we adopted a simple operational decision for forecasting the needed parameters, and 
then applied the K-M allocation rule. Specifically, we assumed that quarterly class prices, 
product disappearance, price elasticities, and generic advertising elasticities would be equal to 
their historical five-year averages (e.g., see Table 1). These values were then used to compute 
revenue shares and reduced-form price elasticities. The results of this approach are given in the 
bottom of Table 2, as Allocation Investment Rule 2.
This rule may provide a “reasonable” prediction of the future, reducing annual 
fluctuations due to other year-specific circumstances, and it is more operationally feasible for 
staff to administer. One could easily apply other prediction rules to capture the needed 
parameters. The simple operational decision implemented here is used to highlight typical 
seasonal investment behavior and compute producer welfare gains from a logistically feasible 
approach.
Using Rule 2, the optimal fluid milk advertising expenditure allocation was a seasonal 
spending pattern consistent with the New York applications of Kinnucan and Forker (1986) and
17
Liu and Forker (1990). Optimal quarterly allocations were estimated to be 0.27, 0.23, 0.23, and 
0.27 for quarters one through four, respectively (Table 2). While a clearer seasonal spending 
pattern resulted, the magnitude of change across quarters was moderate; i.e., 54% of annual 
budgets should be allocated to the first and fourth quarters, 46% to the second and third quarters. 
This is not unexpected given that the seasonal allocation results from Rule 1 varied across years. 
Compared with average actual spending patterns, the optimal allocations from Rule 2 support 
spending less in quarter 2 and more in quarter 4.
Given the relatively larger differences in optimal allocations for cheese from Rule 1, it 
was not surprising that the Rule 2 allocation results were even more similar across quarters. 
Specifically, optimal quarterly allocations were estimated to be 0.26, 0.24, 0.25, and 0.25 for 
quarters one through four, respectively (Table 2). This more even distribution of advertising 
would imply relatively significant increases in third quarter spending and decreases in fourth 
quarter spending, compared to actual historical averages.
V. PRODUCER WELFARE IMPACTS
To determine what economic gains would follow from optimizing allocation of advertising 
expenditures, changes in producer surplus were calculated for each quarter, 1997-2001.8 Given 
shifts in seasonal advertising expenditures in both positive and negative directions, some quarters 
may see producer surplus gains, while others may see reductions. However, on an annual basis, 
producer welfare will be improved by the reallocation. Average gains by quarter for both 
investment rules are displayed in Table 3. Producer surplus losses in quarter two (four) for fluid 
milk (cheese) result from the reductions in advertising spending compared to actual historical
levels.
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As expected, gains from the Rule 1 approach were larger than those from Rule 2.
Average annual producer surplus gains from advertising reallocation were approximately $30 
million for fluid milk and $13 million for cheese (Table 3). While these gains are small relative 
to annual industry revenues (i.e., less than 0.5 percent based on class prices and product 
disappearance), they are substantial relative to the annual advertising investment. That is, gains 
in producer welfare from reallocating existing annual budgets are approximately 18 percent and 
24 percent of annual advertising investments for fluid milk and cheese, respectively (Table 3).
The results from Rule 1 give estimates of producer welfare changes if optimal allocation 
decisions were made each year. That is, the allocation results indicate what should have been 
implemented optimally to maximize producer returns to advertising if one knew a priori what the 
actual market parameters were going to be. The Rule 2 approach is based on predicting what the 
parameter estimates will be in order to determine optimal allocation for the future, and for this 
reason, welfare gains from this approach are probably more realistic than the Rule 1 results. 
Annual welfare gains from the second approach are approximately two-thirds of those realized 
by the Rule 1 approach, but the gains are still substantial: producer surplus changes relative to 
annual advertising investments are 12 percent and 14 percent for fluid milk and cheese, 
respectively. That both scenarios show gains highlights the importance of considering seasonal 
advertising allocation decisions so as to achieve greater benefits from existing advertising 
investments.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Though studies have been made of optimizing seasonal allocations of generic advertising 
for fluid milk markets in New York City, no analogous studies have been made of national fluid 
milk and cheese advertising programs. This paper applied a seasonal advertising allocation rule
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to empirical results from a time-varying parameter demand model on national fluid milk and 
cheese disappearance that incorporates generic advertising expenditures. National farmer-funded 
programs for both fluid milk and cheese advertising were considered, as were contributions to 
fluid milk advertising from fluid milk processors.
Using annual historical data and parameter estimates, we found optimal seasonal 
allocation decisions to be relatively variable across years, particularly for cheese products. This 
variability makes such results not particularly useful for planning purposes, and so an alternative 
decision rule based on historical average statistics was used. Consistent with previous studies of 
New York fluid milk, average seasonal advertising allocations on a national basis for fluid milk 
exhibited higher optimal expenditures in the fall and winter, and lower expenditures in the spring 
and summer. These results reflect both higher revenue shares and generic advertising’s impact 
on price during these periods. Average seasonal allocations for cheese, however, exhibited 
optimal expenditures that were more even across quarters, reflecting higher revenue shares in the 
latter half of the year and generic advertising’s stronger influence in the first half of the year.
Estimates of producer welfare gains are substantial, with average gains of 12 to 24 
percent of annual advertising investments over all products and investment rules evaluated. Such 
favorable results should provide an incentive for policy makers and marketers alike to adjust 
promotion campaigns according to market signals and allocation rules that return the highest 
benefits to the producers who fund them. Also, the empirical results indicate that the optimal 
seasonal spending patterns for fluid milk and cheese clearly differ, highlighting differences in 
domestic consumption patterns.
Given that optimal seasonal allocations varied across years, using mean historical data as 
a forecast tool may be insufficient. Future applications should consider determining appropriate
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price, elasticity, and advertising forecasts so as to better predict what advertising budget 
allocations would be optimal in the future. Also, unless separate estimates of advertising’s 
effectiveness by farmer and milk processor groups are available, achieving optimal allocations 
will require the collaboration of both participants.
While the allocation investment rule is general enough to allow for product substitution 
effects, the empirical application here ignores these and therefore may overstate welfare gains 
from advertising. Future research should examine more rigorously the importance of 
substitution effects for these products. Finally, while seasonal allocation decisions are an 
important component of maximizing returns to farmer-funded advertising efforts, a more 
complete analysis should investigate both the level and distribution of advertising dollars.
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FOOTNOTES
1 For further details, see Kinnucan and Myrland (2002).
2 The brand advertising goodwill variable is similarly constructed to compute the brand 
advertising lag-weights from estimated coefficients \ b (i=0,1,2).
3
The lag weight on the sixth lag is defined to be approximately zero (exp(-30)) and the 
current period is normalized to one. Using these restrictions and collecting terms, we arrive at 
the following lag-weight formulation: wjg = exp(-5j  + X2g (j 2 -  6j )) j  = 1,.. .,6.
4 For further estimation details and empirical results, see Schmit and Kaiser (2004).
5 Separate pairwise comparisons were made for each year and for the five-year average 
price elasticities to determine whether the quarterly price elasticity estimates within each year 
were statistically different from one another. Both Likelihood Ratio (LR) and Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) tests were computed using the PROC MODEL procedure in SAS. Statistical 
differences occurred in 83% to 100% of pairwise comparisons across both tests and products. 
Specific test results are available upon request.
6 LR and LM tests of statistical differences in quarterly advertising elasticities were 
conducted. Statistical differences occurred in 73% to 100% of pairwise comparisons across both 
products and test procedures. These relatively high levels of statistical difference lend 
confidence to their use in the optimal allocation application.
7
The Class I price is defined as the Class III milk price (or Basic Formula price) plus a 
fixed fluid milk price differential.
8 Following Kinnucan and Myrland (2002), quarterly producer surplus changes ( APSk ) 
were computed using the formula: APSk = p kqkEpkaka*(1 + 0.5s Epkaka*), where a*is the relative 
change in advertising expenditures needed to equal the optimal allocation. This calculation
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inherently assumes parallel demand shifts and a linear supply curve in the relevant region 
(Kinnucan and Myrland, 2002).
ABBREVIATIONS 
ADV: Advertising 
CWT: Hundredweight 
EDL: Exponential Distributed Lag 
K-M: Kinnucan-Myrland 
MFE: Milk Fat Equivalent 
P1: Class I Milk Price 
P3: Class III Milk Price
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TABLE 1
Average Quarterly Input Variables, Elasticities, and Computed Parameters, 1997-2001
Generic Advertising Class and Farm Prices Fluid Supply and Product 
______ Expenditures ($mill)a_________ ($/cwt)_____________Disappearance (MFE) b
Quarter
Fluid
Milk Cheese Class I Class III
Blend
Price
Milk
Supply
Fluid
Milk Cheese
1 43.454 13.943 16.38 12.21 14.47 40.48 14.00 15.97
2 43.080 13.324 15.57 11.97 13.93 41.85 13.49 16.64
3 37.211 11.567 15.97 14.09 15.13 39.72 13.59 16.92
4 39.211 15.055 17.11 12.95 15.30 39.77 14.16 17.70
Average 40.739 13.472 16.26 12.81 14.71 40.45 13.81 16.81
Price
Elasticities
Generic Adv. 
Elasticities
Revenue 
Shares c
Reduced Form 
Adv. Elasticities
Quarter
Fluid
Milk Cheese
Fluid
Milk Cheese
Fluid
Milk Cheese
Fluid
Milk Cheese
1 0.046 0.298 0.0304 0.0336 0.255 0.226 0.085 0.055
2 0.052 0.297 0.0290 0.0305 0.234 0.231 0.079 0.050
3 0.055 0.307 0.0286 0.0273 0.241 0.276 0.078 0.044
4 0.050 0.308 0.0290 0.0277 0.270 0.266 0.080 0.045
Average 0.051 0.303 0.0293 0.0298 0.250 0.250 0.080 0.048
a Advertising expenditures and prices are in real $2001. 
b Product disappearance is on a Milk Fat Equivalent basis (MFE). 
c Revenue shares are computed using class prices and product disappearance.
Source: 2002 DMI (advertising expenditures), 2002 USDA Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry Outlook 
(prices, farm supply, and product disappearance).
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TABLE 2
Optimal Seasonal Generic Advertising Expenditure Shares, 1997-2001
Fluid Milk Cheese
Percent Percent
Year Quarter Actual Optimal Difference Actual Optimal Difference
Allocation Investment Rule 1 (Historical Quarterly Estimates):
1997 1 0.273 0.282 3.4% 0.274 0.283 3.4%
2 0.256 0.253 -0.9% 0.258 0.226 -12.3%
3 0.232 0.209 -10.0% 0.190 0.229 20.4%
4 0.240 0.256 6.7% 0.278 0.262 -5.8%
1998 1 0.253 0.243 -3.9% 0.250 0.230 -8.0%
2 0.241 0.225 -6.4% 0.269 0.212 -21.2%
3 0.231 0.236 2.4% 0.202 0.244 20.7%
4 0.276 0.296 7.1% 0.279 0.314 12.5%
1999 1 0.287 0.340 18.4% 0.250 0.286 14.4%
2 0.260 0.193 -25.6% 0.247 0.238 -3.9%
3 0.240 0.202 -15.6% 0.195 0.272 39.4%
4 0.213 0.264 24.1% 0.307 0.204 -33.6%
2000 1 0.217 0.246 13.2% 0.273 0.263 -3.6%
2 0.287 0.246 -14.2% 0.227 0.265 16.8%
3 0.276 0.249 -9.7% 0.242 0.253 4.3%
4 0.219 0.258 17.8% 0.258 0.219 -15.0%
2001 1 0.306 0.230 -24.9% 0.250 0.235 -6.2%
2 0.295 0.238 -19.3% 0.233 0.270 16.0%
3 0.147 0.275 86.7% 0.244 0.265 8.6%
4 0.252 0.258 2.2% 0.273 0.230 -15.7%
Allocation Investment Rule 2 (Average Historical Quarterly Estimates):
1 0.267 0.269 0.5% 0.259 0.259 -0.2%
2 0.268 0.231 -13.9% 0.247 0.241 -2.3%
3 0.225 0.234 3.7% 0.215 0.253 17.9%
4 0.240 0.267 11.3% 0.279 0.247 -11.5%
27
TABLE 3
Average Producer Surplus Changes from Alternative Allocation Rules
Fluid Milk a Cheese a
Quarter Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 1 Rule 2
1 6.04 1.31 1.25 0.56
2 -21.01 -21.35 0.02 -1.62
3 22.57 17.42 21.40 20.47
4 22.50 22.34 -9.84 -11.84
Total $30.10 $19.72 $12.83 $7.58
Avg. Annual
Advertising $162.96 $162.96 $53.89 $53.89
Proportion 0.18 0.12 0.24 0.14
a Million 2001 dollars
Fl
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FIGURE 1
Own-Price Elasticities of Demand (absolute value)
Fluid Milk Cheese
Source: Schmit and Kaiser (2004)
Year.Quarter
40
.38
36
34
.32
30
28
26
24
22
20
C
he
es
e
L
on
g-
R
un
 E
la
st
ic
ity
29
FIGURE 2
Long-Run Generic Advertising Elasticities of Demand
Year.Quarter
R
ev
en
ue
 S
ha
re
30
FIGURE 3
Quarterly Farm-Level Revenue Shares
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FIGURE 4
Reduced-Form Elasticities for Price with Respect to Generic Advertising
Year.Quarter
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1
Econometric Estimates From Time-varying Parameter Model
V ariab le Param eter F lu id  M ilk a C heesea
Intercept aom,aoc -2.704 -10.236
(1 .0 5 0 ) (1 .5 3 9 )
ln  Price a im,aic -0.160 -0.377
(0 .1 9 0 ) (0 .1 4 0 )
ln  Income a™,a2c 0.107 0.691
(0 .1 4 0 ) (0 .1 8 7 )
ln  T a3m -0.078 na
(0 .0 1 9 )
ln  FAFH a3c na 0.694
(0 .2 4 7 )
ln  AGE5 a4m -0.250 na
(0 .4 1 7 )
ln  OTHER a/ na 0.121
(0 .1 0 6 )
BST a 5m -0.043 na
(0 .0 1 3 )
QTR1 a6m ,asc -0.008 -0.082
(0 .0 0 4 ) (0 .0 0 7 )
QTR2 a7m ,a6c -0.051 -0.050
(0 .0 0 4 ) (0 .0 0 8 )
QTR3 a 8m,a7c -0.049 -0.052
(0 .0 0 3 ) (0 .0 0 7 )
ln  BAGW -0.004 -0.001
(0 .0 0 7 ) (0 .0 1 7 )
Intercept (y ) m c0o ,0o -10.986 -3.011
(3 .5 0 4 ) (10 .5 4 5 )
Price (y ) m c  °1 ,01 0.948 1.033
(1 .5 5 1 ) (3 .1 6 6 )
Income ( y ) m c  02 ,02 0.022 -0.008
(0 .0 1 4 ) (0 .0 4 3 )
FAFH ( y ) 03c na -0.044
(0 .0 4 3 )
AGE5 ( y ) m03 1.258 na
(0 .4 9 8 )
AGE2044 (y ) 04c na 0.071
(0 .1 1 7 )
BLACK ( y ) m04 -0.456 na
(0 .2 9 2 )
OTHER ( y ) 8/ na 1.562
(0 .9 6 8 )
A R (1 ) 0.221 na
(0 .1 4 0 )
B rand W e igh t 2^,4 -1.918 -1.490
Param eter (0 .3 1 0 ) (0 .4 5 0 )
G en er ic  W e igh t 2^,g -5.545 -2.099
Param eter (0 .7 4 3 ) (0 .5 5 8 )
A d ju sted  R -square 0.945 0.988
T est 8t = 0 V i >0  L R  Stat.
P r>C h i.S q .
17.61
0.002
12.62
0.027
a S ta n d a rd  e rro rs  a re  in  p a re n th e se s . D e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le  is th e  n a tu ra l lo g a r ith m  o f  p e r  c a p i ta  
d isa p p e a ra n c e .
Source: S c h m it a n d  K a is e r  (2 0 0 4 )
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